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ABSTRACT 
Academic consulting is an important and effective means of knowledge transfer with the public 
and private sectors. It offers opportunities for research application but also raise concerns over 
potentially negative consequences for academic research and its dissemination. For a sample 
of social, natural and engineering science academics in Germany and controlling for the 
selection into consulting, we investigate the effect of consulting to public and private sector 
organisations on research performance. While previous research suggested that consulting 
activities might come at the cost of reduced research output, our analysis provides a more 
nuanced picture. Public sector consulting comes with lower average citations particularly for 
junior researchers. Moreover, engagement in consulting increases the probability to cease 
publishing research altogether particularly for private sector consulting. The probability of exit 
from academic research increases with the intensity of consulting engagement for those at the 
start or towards the end of their academic career and in fields for which the public-private wage 
gap and opportunities for engagement in duties outside academia are higher. We draw lessons 
for research institutions and policy about the promotion of academic consulting. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, universities have become more proactive in offering their professional services 
to non-academic organisations. In the UK, for instance, income from consulting has increased by 
50% over the past 10 years and now accounts for 10% of total external university income 
(HEFCE, 2017). Academic consulting in this context is typically defined as an advisory service 
performed by academics who apply their scholarly expertise for a non-academic organisation, 
often – but not always – for financial compensation, and without the creation of new knowledge 
(Perkmann and Walsh, 2008; Amara et al., 2013; HEFCE, 2017). Academic consulting is not a 
new phenomenon and has played an important role in the rise of American industry and academia 
(Shimshoni, 1970; Lowen, 1990). Today it is increasingly conspicuous amongst academics in the 
US and in Europe (Perkmann et al., 2013) and highly valued in industry and government as a 
means to gain insights into academic research (Cohen et al., 2002; Bekkers and Bodas Freitas, 
2008; Haucap and Thomas, 2014).  
Despite its importance, evidence regarding the effects that consulting has on academic research 
is still sparse. Private and public organisations gain prominence in academia through consulting, 
by providing income to academics or their institutions and by shaping or inspiring research 
agendas, with potential consequences for academics. Prior literature on university-industry 
interactions has examined the potential influence that private sector involvement can have on 
academic research, raising concerns for openness and the pursuit of fundamental research (Boyer 
and Lewis, 1984; Blumenthal et al. 1996; Thursby et al., 2007) while also acknowledging positive 
spillovers, including ideas and revenue for research (Lee, 2000; Perkmann and Walsh, 2008; 
Buenstorf, 2009).   
Less studied, albeit very widespread, is academics’ involvement with the public sector. We could 
suspect that insights from the knowledge transfer literature can be applied also to the case of 
public sector consulting, however, the services expected by public and private organisation can 
differ substantially as may financial compensations. Moreover, public and private sectors clearly 
differ in their management and organisation with potentially different ramifications for 
academics working with these sectors (Boyne, 2002). Recognising that these two consulting 
modes may have differing effects on research is crucial for defining government and university 
policy. 
In this paper we thus focus on two forms of academic consulting, which coexist and comprise 
different types of knowledge and services - consulting with the public and with the private sector 
-, and investigate the relationship between consulting and research outcomes. In order to do so, 
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we firstly need to understand whether there are differences in the types of academics that provide 
advice to the public and private sectors. Again, while the drivers of private sector consulting have 
been discussed extensively within the context of university-industry interactions (e.g. Klofsten 
and Jones-Evans, 2000; D’Este and Patel, 2007; Link et al. 2007; Perkmann and Walsh, 2009; 
Jensen et al., 2010; Grimpe and Hussinger, 2013), much less is known about public sector 
consulting. The few insights into overall public sector engagement suggest that it is more 
widespread in the medical and social sciences disciplines (Hughes et al., 2016), fields that have 
been found to engage little with the private sector, suggesting that we could expect different 
selection effects. 
First evidence regarding the effect of academic consulting on publication numbers, comes from 
the US (Rebne, 1989; Mitchell and Rebne, 1995) and Spain (Rentocchini et al., 2014). While the 
former find a positive but marginal effect for consulting time on publications at low to moderate 
levels, the latter reports a negative effect for very high amounts of income generated. These 
studies have some limitations: The US studies only consider private sector interactions and do 
not control for selection into consulting. The Spanish study, on the other hand, only considers 
university income generating forms of consulting. However, we know that academics often work 
with industry directly, bypassing their university (Bodas Freitas et al., 2013), and that consulting 
can happen pro bono and therefore does not always create a reliable paper stream (Amara et al., 
2013; Perkmann et al., 2015).  
Our analysis builds on data from a sample of more than 900 academics in Germany in various 
disciplines and makes use of survey information on academics’ work time distributions in a usual 
workweek to identify the occurrence and intensity of different consulting activities. In terms of 
research outcomes, we study publication numbers and citations to publications for those who stay 
research active. In addition, we consider the outcome of zero publications as an exit from 
academic research as potential consequence from consulting. We observe consulting academics 
to have a higher probability to cease publishing altogether, but our analysis does not find lower 
ex-post scientific publication numbers for those who do not exit. Moreover, consulting to the 
public sector is associated with lower average citation numbers, which may indicate publications 
of less relevance for academic research. We observe disciplinary as well as academic rank 
differences, which we attribute to differences in career opportunities and research spillovers that 
can be realised. 
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2. Consulting and research outcomes 
2.1 The effect of consulting to the public and private sector 
Public debate repeatedly centred on the possible impact that consulting activities with public and 
private organisations may have on academic research outcomes, including scientific publications, 
research agenda setting, collaborative research or probability to exit from academia (Erk and 
Schmidt, 2014; OECD, 2015). Theoretical arguments underpinning much of the literature on 
university-industry interactions have generally argued that academics face time-allocation issues 
leading to trade-offs for research unless spillovers can be utilised (Jensen et al., 2010; Bianchini 
et al., 2016). Still, despite calls for more empirical evidence, little attention has been given to the 
investigation of consulting and its potential research spillovers.  
Most empirical studies to date have considered wider knowledge transfer activities with industry, 
which may include consulting, contract research, academic patenting and entrepreneurship, in 
their investigation. This literature largely found that academic patenting and academic 
entrepreneurship are positively related to research performance (van Looy et al., 2006; Breschi 
et al., 2007; Thursby et al., 2007; Fabrizio and DiMinin, 2008; Azoulay et al., 2009; Buenstorf, 
2009; Czarnitzki and Toole, 2010). The positive spillover effect has been linked to research ideas 
obtained through the involvement in more applied research projects or financial benefits from 
commercialisation that feeds positively into academic research (Lee, 2000; Breschi et al., 2007; 
Buenstorf, 2009). Sceptics, instead, have argued that engagement in knowledge exchange 
activities may result in late- or non-dissemination of research results (Blumenthal et al, 1996; 
Florida and Cohen, 1999; Krimsky, 2003; Czarnitzki et al., 2015) or in applied research agendas 
that are less suitable to journal publications (Etzkowitz and Webster, 1998; Vavakova, 1998; 
Hottenrott and Lawson, 2014). Empirically, several studies looking at the effect of collaborative 
and contract research income on research productivityi find that it leads to fewer publications or 
fewer citations per paper, thus providing some evidence for potentially negative spillovers 
(Manjarrés-Henríquez et al., 2009; Hottenrott and Thorwarth, 2011, Banal-Estañol et al., 2015).  
Results from the few existing empirical studies that explicitly explore the influence of academic 
consulting on research performance suggest that, at least in the case of private sector consulting, 
it does not compromise academic research, at least up to a certain threshold. For example, Rebne 
(1989) and Mitchell and Rebne (1995), studying consulting amongst US academics, find a 
positive relationship at low to moderate levels of time spent on consulting with industry and 
research productivity, but a decline at high levels. More recently, in the case of academics in 
Spain, Manjarrés-Henrìquez et al. (2009) and Rentocchini et al. (2014) find a negative effect of 
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consulting on publications, if a considerable amount of income is generated from it. These results 
suggest that consulting activities, particularly at high engagement intensities, may crowd out 
research activities, but also that consulting can complement publications up to a certain threshold.  
The link between public sector consulting and research performance has instead not yet been 
explicitly explored. The nature of public sector consulting can be quite different from interactions 
with private firms with implications for the extent to which research spillovers can be realised. 
Public consulting often serves the purpose of supporting government decisions ex-ante or 
evaluating government policies ex-post. It also often involves submitting recommendations or 
developing guidelines (OECD, 2015). Academics may also be called on to serve on expert 
committees (OECD, 2015), such as the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) where economists 
provide direct consulting to the US government, or the Standing Committee on Immunisation 
(STIKO), which is composed of medical experts and provides recommendations concerning 
vaccination schedules in Germany. Still, the potential for cross-fertilization in terms of ideas and 
funding may be low in consulting activities with the public sector which is more likely reputation-
based and focused on past expertise rather than addressing problems at the research frontier. 
Public sector consulting may therefore to a lesser extent be linked to a specific skill or current 
research project of an academic compared to private sector consulting, which is more about 
technology- or problem-specific knowledge. Translational skills are needed for both types of 
consulting, but in the case of private sector consulting translation may go from basic to applied 
research (Hottenrott, 2012) while in public sector consulting academics translate research into 
policy or layman’s terms (Salter, 1988; Jasanoff, 1990). Thus even though insights into policy 
problems may have the potential to result in scholarly articles as well as revenue for academics 
(Jacobson et al., 2005), the problems may be rather context-specific or of local relevance and 
revenues from public sector consulting may be less substantial compared to income generated 
with the private sector. Overall, they may thus be less effectual at supporting academics’ overall 
research efforts through cross-funding.  
Based on these arguments, we expect the trade-offs between consulting and research and the 
effects on publication numbers to be similar for private and public sector consulting. In terms of 
scientific quality or general scientific relevance, as indicated by citations to research articles, this 
may imply that public consulting comes at the price of fewer citations. Private sector consulting 
may also result in more applied research, but still be relevant to, and thus cited by, the applied 
research community.  
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At the far end, i.e. when a large share of time is dedicated to consulting, the negative spillovers 
may result in an exit from academic research. Specifically, in pursuing outside activities, 
academics may stop academic research to engage full time in other occupations including 
consulting, board services or spin-off creation. This exit can be due to insufficient relevance of 
consulting for research or time constraints that no longer allow for the pursuit of publishable 
research, such as a full-time move into consulting (Czarnitzki and Toole, 2010; Toole and 
Czarnitzki 2010; Hottenrott and Lawson, 2014; 2017). Hottenrott and Lawson (2017) show, for 
instance, that university departments that engage in contract research with industry are more 
likely to see departing academics move to the private sector or to non-research work within the 
public and university sector. Consulting may thus be conducive to a move out of academia or the 
take-up of more administrative or advisory posts within the university or research institute, 
activities that would not result in publications in academic journals.  
2.2 Discipline and academic rank as moderating factors 
In the discussion of research spillovers, it is important to consider that engagement in consulting 
does not occur at random. This becomes particularly apparent when comparing disciplinary fields 
or academic ranks (Bianchini et al., 2016). In engineering the share of academics engaged in 
private sector or paid consulting is particularly high when compared to other fields (D’Este and 
Patel, 2007; Landry et al., 2010; Rentocchini et al., 2014). A 2015 survey of more the 18,000 UK 
academics, for example, found that 44% of academics in engineering provided consulting 
services in the previous three years, compared to just 25% in natural sciences or the humanities 
(Hughes et al., 2016). The same survey, however, finds that public sector engagement and 
advisory board services are particularly relevant for groups that have been found to engage little 
with the private sector, such as social and medical sciences. Consulting has moreover been linked 
to seniority, with the most senior academics having more opportunities to engage in consulting 
regardless of sector, most likely for reputation reasons (Link et al., 2007, Boardman and 
Ponomariov, 2009; Amara et al., 2013; Rentocchini et al., 2014).  
The non-random engagement in consulting has consequences for its spillovers onto research. The 
groups of academics that have more opportunities to provide consulting, i.e. the more 
experienced and those in more applied fields, may be able to generate more positive spillovers 
from their consulting work (Bianchini et al., 2016) as they may be better able to link consulting 
to their research, and thus be less likely to compromise their publishing activities. This means 
that for these academics consulting should be less likely to lead to a reduction in the number of 
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publications or citations, compared to those that have fewer engagement opportunities, i.e. the 
younger and those in more basic science field.  
Again, at the far end, i.e. when a large share of time is dedicated to consulting, these groups may 
be more likely to exit from academic research as discussed above. The probability to exit from 
academic research has generally been attributed to a low ‘taste for science’ (Roach and 
Sauermann 2010; Balsmeier and Pellens, 2014) or the attractiveness of the private sector 
compared to the academic one (Stephan 2012). These attributes relate heavily to external demand 
and time-allocation and are likely to differ by disciplinary field and academic rank. Academics 
in fields that provide ample opportunity for consulting may have a lower taste for science relative 
to other academics and see more opportunities outside of research. They may therefore ex-ante 
be more likely to exit from publishable research. Moreover, private sector organisations typically 
pay better for highly specialized scientific expertise raising the opportunity costs of a research 
career (Agarwal and Ohyama, 2013; Balsmeier and Pellens, 2016) especially in science and 
engineering (BUWIN, 2017, p. 182-183).  Moreover, academics close to the end of their career 
may cash in on their experience and reputation through engaging in consulting or other less 
research-oriented activities at the expense of publishing (see Bianchini et al., 2016; Zucker et al., 
2002). In terms of career progress there are usually no disadvantages to the decision of focussing 
on non-research related tasks for senior and tenured academic staff in countries such as Germany. 
Younger academics at the start or training phase of their career face a different effort allocation 
problem. While one could argue that their opportunity costs for leaving academic research are 
lower, they usually also have fewer opportunities to engage in consulting. However, those, that 
are not yet decided on a specific career or have an overall lower taste for science (Balsmeier and 
Pellens, 2014), may find that consulting raises their employability outside academia and thus are 
more likely to exit from research.  
To summarise, a researcher’s discipline and rank may moderate the effect of consulting on 
research outcomes and the likelihood to cease publishing altogether. At the high end of consulting 
we expect junior researchers who are not yet settled on an academic career and very senior 
academics who have more outside opportunities to be more likely to exit from academic research, 
while at the low-to mid-range we expect senior academic staff to generate more positive 
spillovers. Further, academics in engineering may be more likely to generate positive research 
spillovers compared to those in the social sciences or more basic science disciplines but are also 
expected to be more likely to exit from academic research due to better outside opportunities and 
demand.  
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3. Data and model specification 
3.1 Data 
We build on data from a survey of academics in Germany at both, universities and non-university 
public research organisations (PROs).ii The survey was conducted by the Centre for European 
Economic Research (ZEW) in 2008 and targeted academics in the humanities and social sciences, 
engineering, life science and natural sciences. Researchers were contacted by email. Contact 
information on university researchers was obtained from the “Hochschullehrerverzeichnis” 
which is a register of university personnel. Email addresses for researchers at PROs (Fraunhofer 
Society, Max Planck Society, Helmholtz Association, Leibniz Association) was collected using 
internet search. This yielded a sample of 16,269 researchers of which 2,797 responded to the 
survey (including incomplete responses). Survey questions referred to the pre-survey period from 
2002 to 2008 or to the current year. We complemented the survey data with publication data from 
Thomson Reuters Web of Science (WoS). In particular, we performed text field searches on the 
academics’ names in the publication database (articles, books, reviews, proceedings) and 
manually screened matches based on CV and website information. Further, we searched the 
Espace database of the European Patent Office and the database of German Patent Office for 
patents on which the academics appear as inventors. As in the case of publications, all matches 
were manually checked. Eventually, we obtain publication and patent records for all individual 
academics from 2002 until 2013 and citations to their publications until autumn 2015. In our 
cross-section of academics, publications are collected for a pre- and post-survey period. The 
collection window, and thus the citation time windows, are identical for all surveyed academics. 
The censoring of citations to newer articles should thus be of minor concern. Removing 
observations with incomplete records in the survey questions, the final sample comprises 951 
individual-level observations. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all the variables used in 
the analysis (for pairwise correlations see Table A.1 in the Online Appendix).  
Representativeness of the sample 
To check for the representativeness of our sample we compare it to the German academic 
population as a whole in terms of institution type, gender, discipline and age (see Table A.2. in 
the Online Appendix) Aggregate information on the academic population was collected from the 
Federal Statistical Office data base (DESTATIS). The sample distribution differs somewhat from 
the population in terms of institution types because of an overrepresentation of PROs, an 
intentional aspect of the survey frame. In terms of disciplinary fields there are only small 
differences between the sample and the population. In terms of age classes, we find that younger 
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researchers are underrepresented in the data, which may also contribute to the overrepresentation 
of males. The underrepresentation of young researchers partially stems from the fact that 
surveyed academics were identified using a list of university staff, the Hochschullehrerregister, 
which only lists few junior academics. The differences observed between the population and the 
survey respondents in terms of institution type, age and gender are therefore assumed to not 
represent a non-response bias. Still, to address these sample characteristics, we construct field-
institution type weights to capture some of the observed differences (see also Czarnitzki et al., 
2015). We apply inverse probability weighting using population weights to test the robustness of 
our results to these sample properties. Comparing these to the results of the unweighted models, 
we observe some small differences in the estimated coefficients, but these differences do not 
qualitatively change the results (compare Tables 3 and 4 to Tables A.4 and A.5 in the Online 
Appendix). 
Dependent variables 
The main variables of interest are the research performance of academics in the post-survey 
period (2009 to end 2013) and their (temporary) exit from publishing. We consider the exit from 
research work to be reflected in zero WoS publications in the five year post-survey period (exit). 
This variable thus reflects publication inactivity over that period and not necessarily the 
termination of a work contract. About 18% of academics have no publications in WoS in the 
post-survey period, while the average number of publications is 12.4 and each publication 
receives about 12 citations (average citations) in the time window considered. From the 
individual publication and citation counts, we further derive field-weighted counts to account for 
heterogeneous publication/citation patterns of different disciplines. To obtain these values we 
divide publication counts as well as average citations by the within-sample field averages (field-
weighted publications, field-weighted average citations). A value below one represents a below 
field-average output and a value above one represents an above field-average output.  
Consulting activities 
Our data is distinctive from previous studies in using the time share that academics devote to 
consulting (consulting). The advantage of using survey-based time shares as opposed to 
consulting income or official university recordsiii is that academics have no incentives to under 
or over report their consultancy work. In addition, we capture consulting activities for which no 
financial compensation had been received. Despite the downsides in terms standardisation and 
recall difficulty in surveys, we avoid problems in measuring consulting activities that arise if 
individuals are able to charge very different fees and thus have different levels of income per 
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hour of consulting work. It also captures activities that do not leave a paper trail. The consulting 
time-share refers to a typical work week and is therefore cross-sectional in nature. Based on the 
survey responses, we distinguish between consulting to the private (private consulting) and the 
public sector (public consulting).iv This is different from Rebne (1989) and Mitchell and Rebne 
(1995) who use the number of hours spend on consulting work or Rentocchini et al, (2014) who 
rely on consulting income. 
Table 1 shows that academics spend roughly 5.3% of their time on consulting, on average. 
Among consulting-active academics the average time spent on consulting is 12.2%. By 
comparison, about 50% of time is spent on research, and 21% on each teaching and 
administration (see Table A.3 in the Online Appendix for more details on time distributions).v 
While the overall time-share devoted to academic consulting is not high, 44% of academics 
reportedly engaged in some form of consulting at the time of the survey; about 17% provide 
consulting only to the public sector, 13% only to the private sector, and 14% to both. A detailed 
comparison of consulting active and inactive academics is provided in section 3.2.  
Moderators 
Of the academics in the sample, 21% belong to social sciences (and humanities), 30% to life 
sciences (biology, medicine, agriculture and veterinary sciences), 31% to the natural sciences 
(chemistry, physics, earth science and mathematics) and 19% are active in engineering. More 
than half of the sample are employed as professors (54%), 11% are assistant professors 
(including academics working towards habilitation), 26% are senior researchers and about 10% 
are junior researchers (scientific assistance staff that do not hold and/or are studying for a PhD).  
Controls 
A series of other controls are included that have been shown to affect publication outcomes, such 
as age and gender (e.g. Toole and Czarnitzki, 2010; Mairesse and Pezzoni, 2015). Academics 
are, on average, 49 years old (age), and 15% are female. More than half of the academics in the 
sample (59%) are employed at universities (university), while the rest work at PROs or other 
research institutions. We also include variables that capture the effect of network and funding on 
academic output. This includes the size of the local peer group in terms of the number of people 
from the same institution working in closely related fields (peergroup size), a measure for 
collaborative reach based on the location of research partners during the 2002 to 2008 periodvi, 
and a measure for international visibility based on reported international conference participation 
during an average year. The survey also includes information on academics’ grant-based research 
income from the European Union, national and regional governments, science foundations, such 
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as the German Research foundations (DFG), industry and other external funders during the 
period 2002 to 2006. Funding amounts are aggregated into, industry funding and public funding. 
Finally, we include a binary indicator for co-authored articles with employees from the private 
sector in the previous 12 months (coauthorship industry), and the number of patents in the pre-
survey period (patents) as additional controls.  
All regression models also include pre-survey publication and citation numbers (between 2002 
and 2008) as predictors of future publication performance. In addition, we control for the average 
number of co-authors on publications in the pre-survey period (average number of co-authors). 
Academics published on average 12 items in the pre-survey period and received an average of 
24 citations per publication. The average number of co-authors is about four with the lower values 
in the social sciences (1.2) and engineering (3.4) compared to the life sciences (5.4) and the 
natural sciences (7.8).  
-------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
-------------------------- 
 
3.2 Descriptive analysis of consulting-activity 
Table 2 compares the mean values of the dependent variables (publications, citations and exit), 
and the moderators academic rank and discipline by consulting activity. We observe higher 
average number of publications, but fewer citations for consulting active researchers and no 
significant different share of “exits”. In addition to the mean comparisons, Figure 1 shows the 
number of publications and average citations per publication (in the post-survey period) over 
different percentiles of the consulting time-share distribution. For both variables and both types 
of consulting, research output, in particular the median, tends to be lower at higher time-shares 
spent on consulting. These descriptive statistics suggest that not consulting engagement as such 
matters, but the intensity of the engagement.  
 
-------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
-------------------------- 
-------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
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-------------------------- 
Table 2 further shows that in the social sciences, public sector consulting is more prevalent than 
private sector consulting or no consulting, while in life and natural sciences the differences are 
less pronounced. In natural sciences, we observe the overall lowest involvement in consulting. 
In engineering, consulting with the private sector is reported by about 34% of academics (see 
Table A.3 in the Online Appendix for consulting time-shares and the share of consulting-active 
academics by discipline). Looking at academic rank, we see that the share of full professor is 
largest in all consulting groups and also significantly larger than in the non-consulting active sub-
sample. Also a large share of senior researchers is engaged in consulting, with little differences 
between types, while assistant professors are least represented in all consulting types. For junior 
researchers public consulting is slightly less common than private sector consulting or no 
consulting.  
It is moreover interesting to point out, that certain attributes differ considerably between 
consulting-active and non-consulting active academics. While the former spend significantly less 
time on block-funded research (17% versus 23%) and less time on grant-based research (30% 
versus 34%), teaching loads differ only slightly (20% versus 23%) and administrative duties are 
similar (both 21%). These numbers suggest that consulting may substitute research, but is not 
associated with a higher administrative burden or less time devoted to teaching (see Table A.3 in 
the Online Appendix).  
3.3 Estimation Strategy  
We estimate the probability of exit and the publication performance while accounting for 
selection into consulting. Engagement in consulting does not occur at random and modelling the 
selection into consulting enables us to correct for the selection bias in consulting activity. 
Moreover, we prefer selection type models over other treatment effects models as they allow to 
follow a suggestion by Wooldridge (2002, p. 594) to include the logarithm of an academic’s pre-
sample research performancevii in the outcome equations to capture i) path dependency and 
cumulative advantage effects in publication and citation numbers and ii) the otherwise 
unobserved ability to publish of an individual academic. These initial performance variables 
proxy for permanent individual unobservable effects, or “fixed” effects, which are not directly 
observable, but associated with underlying variables, including individual capability, motivation 
and talent (Mairesse and Pezzoni, 2015). Finally, our modelling approach also has the advantage 
that we can explicitly model the propensity to engage in consulting. The results from the selection 
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stage are informative as such and also enable a closer comparison to the existing academic 
consulting literature. 
In the model’s selection equation we include personal and institutional attributes which have 
been shown to be of relevance in explaining academic consulting in several previous studies. In 
addition, the selection equation includes a set of exclusion restrictions which help to identify the 
second stage. These are the share of employment in knowledge-intensive industries in a region 
(regio skills), and commercial activities that have been linked to consulting such as firm 
foundation experience (firm) and technology transfer activities with industry (techtransfer 
industry) during the previous 12 months (the latter two are based on survey responses). The 
variables enter the consulting equation significantly, but are insignificant in the outcome 
equations. The share of employment in knowledge-intensive industries is calculated at the 4-digit 
municipality level based on data from the INKAR database provided by the German Statistical 
Offices in cooperation with The Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and 
Spatial Development (BBSR). The skill-wise labour market composition in a region may 
determine the demand for academic consulting services both for the public and private sector, 
but not affect an individual researcher’s publication performance. Founder experience (unlike 
current entrepreneurial activity) may reflect networks that facilitate consulting, but does not 
directly correlate with the output measures. Likewise, technology transfer through means other 
than consulting create networks to the private sector and generate consulting opportunities, but 
not necessarily affect publications in a particular direction. We test the statistical appropriateness 
of these exclusion restrictions in auxiliary regressions which show that the excluded variables 
are individually and jointly insignificant in the outcome equations, but indeed relevant in the 
selection equation.  
The selection into consulting is thus estimated for each academic i as: 
Pr(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑖 =  𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽
3
𝑛=1 𝑛
𝑒𝑟𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽
𝑘
𝑛=4 𝑛
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖          (1) 
With the vector er referring to the set of exclusion restrictions, k is the total number of regressors 
and parameter 𝑢 is the error term.  
We then proceed in two steps, differentiating between the effects of consulting on exit and on 
research performance. In the research performance models, we exclude individuals with zero 
publications in the five-year post-survey period since we consider these as no longer research 
active. Their zero publication output is captured in the exit models and including them in the 
research performance equations would confound reduced output of research-active academics 
with those that are research in-active. It should be noted here, that inactivity in terms of 
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publications is defined over the relatively long period of 5 years and thus does not apply to 
someone with a publication break of just a single year (or two, or three).  If consulting indeed 
leads to a higher probability of exit, we would potentially overestimate the (negative) effect of 
consulting on research output of those who remain research active due to the zero publication 
counts.  
We thus resume in two steps as follows. We firstly estimate the probability of exit from academic 
research while accounting for the selection into consulting (as specified in equ. 1) using a 
Heckman-type procedure for binary outcome variables estimated by maximum likelihood 
method (van de Ven and van Pragg, 1981; De Luca, 2008). Exit probability is then modelled as 
follows:  
Pr(𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡)𝑖 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖
2 + ∑ 𝛾
𝑘
𝑛=3 𝑛
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 
𝛼𝜌 +  ?̃?𝑖          (2) 
with 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 (𝑢, ?̃?) =  𝜌𝑢,𝑢. A statistically significant 𝛼
𝜌 = 0.5 ln(1 + 𝜌) /(1 − 𝜌) indicates that 
some selection bias would be ignored in the absence of the selection equation. In addition, we 
estimate models with interaction effects between the consulting share and the moderators 
academic rank and disciplinary field.  
This model is first estimated for overall consulting, before we specify a model in which we 
explicitly distinguish time devoted to public sector versus private sector consulting. The second 
order term is included to account for possible non-linear effects. The vector controls includes the 
academics’ age, a gender dummy, a university dummy, field-weighted publications and field-
weighted average citations in the pre-sample period, patents, grant-based research funding, 
scientific field and rank dummies.  
Next, we estimate research performance in terms of publications and citations for those 
academics that remain research active using linear endogenous switching models (LES). LES 
models are a variant of the selection model (see Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004) that account for the 
non-randomness of consulting activity in the effect of consulting on post-survey research 
performance. Unlike Heckman-type correction models, LES models estimate the outcome 
equation for both groups of the selection. This means they also provide an outcome equation for 
consulting inactive academics, allowing for a comparison of control variables between the two 
groups.  
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As above, we estimate separate models for consulting in general and the two types of consulting, 
and for the different publication-based outcome variables:  
ln (𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑖  =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖
2 +
                                   ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑛=3 𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼
𝜌 + ?̃?𝑖        (3) 
The consulting equation is specified according to equation (1) and is estimated jointly with the 
outcome equation (3) via full information maximum likelihood method (FIML) and 𝛼𝜌  is 
calculated as described above. We employ the natural logarithm of the publication count and 
average citation numbers. Log transforming variables with skewed distributions has several 
advantages and is quite common in the context of publication measures (see for instance, Fabrizio 
and Di Minin, 2008; Buenstorf, 2009; Banal-Estañol et al. 2015). First, it reduces the skewness 
of the distribution as well as heteroscedasticity because it suppresses variation in the data and 
makes the error distribution more normal. Second, it makes interpretation straight forward. A one 
percentage point change in our consulting share can be interpreted in terms of percentage change 
in the outcome variable.viii  In addition to these baseline models, we again estimate models with 
interaction effects between the consulting share and the moderators academic rank and 
disciplinary field.  
The exclusion restriction are neither individually nor jointly significant in the publication 
outcome stage for logged publications and for logged average number of citations as outcome 
variables.  
In addition to the selection models that rely on the set of exclusion restrictions, we test the 
robustness of the results to using an instrumental variable (IV) approach suggested by Lewbel 
(2012). This method does not rely on external IVs, but achieves identification through the 
generation of IVs based on heteroscedasticity (see section A.3 and Table A.7 in the Online 
Appendix for details). 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Selection into consulting  
Table 3 shows the results (marginal effects) from the set of probit models that represent the 
selection equation, i.e. the probability of engaging in any consulting (model 1), and results from 
simultaneous probit models on public consulting and/or private sector consulting (model 2).ix As 
expected, we find that academics in the social sciences are more active in public consulting than 
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in science and engineering. There are however fewer differences with regard to involvement with 
the private sector. We further find that professors and junior researchers are more likely to be 
active in consulting, especially in public consulting, than mid-career researchers. Professors are 
also most active in consulting to the private sector. Similar findings were reported in Amara et 
al. (2013) who show that research staff and full professors are more likely to engage in paid 
consulting than mid-career academics. We further find consulting positive effect of age, which 
supports prior findings on the higher likelihood of older academic staff to engage in industry 
consulting (Louis et al., 1989; Boardman and Ponomariov, 2009). Interestingly, the effect of age 
is higher for consulting with the public sector compared to the private sector. We also find that 
women are less likely than men to engage in private sector consulting, while there is no difference 
for public sector consulting. This confirms Abreu and Grinevich (2013), who find that women 
engage less with the private sector but more with the public sector compared to men, and is also 
in line with prior research on industry consulting that consistently showed lower activity for 
women (e.g. Link et al., 2007; Grimpe and Fier, 2010). 
In terms of pre-survey scientific activity, we see that field-weighted average citations are 
negatively correlated with consulting, whereas publication counts show a positive correlation. 
Industry funding correlates strongly and positively with private sector consulting and negatively 
with public sector consulting. The contrary is the case for public funding which contradicts 
previous research by Jensen et al. (2010) and Muscio et al. (2013) who stressed that public 
funding can be a facilitator for research contracts and consulting with the private sector (see also 
D’Este et al., 2013; Amara et al., 2013). The findings further show that collaborative reach 
correlates positively with public sector consulting. The local peer group size is negatively 
associated with public consulting, suggesting that academics working in isolated areas are more 
likely to look for external consulting options. Patenting academics are also less likely to engage 
in public consulting. Finally, co-authorship with industry correlates positively with private sector 
consulting, confirming prior findings in the field (Louis et al., 1989; Landry et al., 2010). The 
correlation between the public and private sector consulting equation is positive and significant, 
pointing to the importance of estimating these equations jointly.x It also indicates that academics 
make use of both engagement modes simultaneously. 
------------------------ 
Table 3 about here 
------------------------ 
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4.2. Consulting and the probability to exit from academic work 
Table 4 presents estimated coefficients from the models on exit from academic research. In 
models 3 and 4 we account for the possibility of retirement and check the sensitivity of the results 
to the exclusion of individuals who were 64 years or older at the time of the survey. In line with 
our expectation, we find that consulting increases the propensity to exit from publishing. This is 
in keeping with studies that report exit following other forms of non-research activities such as 
academic entrepreneurship (Toole and Czarnitzki, 2010). The average marginal effect (AME) 
for consulting (which cannot be directly seen from the coefficient) is 0.002 in model 1 and 0.003 
in model 3 indicating that, on average, an increase in consulting by 10 percentage points increases 
exit probability by about 3% in the subsample of academics below the age of 65 (model 3). The 
effect of consulting, however, is unlikely to be the same for all consulting time-shares. Figure 2 
therefore depicts graphically the predictive margins of consulting on exit probability at different 
consulting shares. We find that the probability to exit increases as consulting increases, but with 
diminishing marginal effects. The slope of the curve is determined by the marginal effects at 
representative values (MERs), i.e. the marginal impact of consulting on exit probability at 
different values of the consulting distribution, and is steepest at consulting time shares between 
10 and about 20%.  
Looking at private and public sector separately we find that in model 4, the AME for private 
sector consulting is 0.002 (significant at 1% level), while the AME of 0.001 for public sector 
consulting is insignificant. The graphs in Figure 2 show that for public sector consulting the 
impact on exit is initially small, explaining the smaller and insignificant AME. At larger 
intensities, particularly between 20 and 50 percent of time spent, exit probability increases 
substantially. This high exit propensity for public sector consulting may be due to academics 
taking on the role of brokers or full time advisors, no longer concerned with their scientific 
research (Haucap and Moedl, 2013). For private sector consulting exit probability increases with 
consulting time-shares, but with decreasing marginal impact at very high intensities around the 
95th percentile and beyond. For relatively common levels of private sector consulting, say 5% of 
time, an increase of consulting by 10 percentage points to 15% will increase exit probability from 
8.9 to 11.1%. For an increase from 20 to 30% the marginal effect is still positive, but slightly 
smaller with an increase from 12.1 to 13.5% exit probability.  
The average effects are thus rather small, but Figure 3 shows that results differ substantially by 
moderators (detailed regression results available upon request). Exit propensity as such is highest 
for junior (pre-PhD) research staff and lowest for assistant professors. Initially, exit propensity 
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increases with consulting time-shares for all ranks, except for junior researchers (top left of 
Figure 3). At higher consulting shares, however, exit probability increases particularly for junior 
researchers and full professors, i.e. the groups that are also more likely to engage in consulting. 
For example, at a consulting time-share of 40% (90th percentile), junior researchers have an exit 
propensity of 80%. These results show that consulting may distract junior academics from 
research and thus steer them away from a research career, in line with concerns voiced by the 
knowledge exchange literature (Blumenthal et al, 1996; Florida and Cohen, 1999). The effect for 
junior researchers is driven by public sector consulting (see bottom left of Figure 3), though 
overall there is little increase in exit probability at lower time-shares, explaining the insignificant 
AME for public consulting. In the case of private sector consulting (see bottom right of Figure 
3), curves also show minor differences for low values, with the steepest slope for senior 
researchers. For full professors the curve is flat up to a 20% consulting share, but positive at 
higher consulting shares. For instance, for an increase in the time-share from 40 to 50% the effect 
on exit probability increases by about 10 percentage points.  
Effects also differ by disciplinary field. In the social sciences, an increase in the consulting share 
is associated with a higher exit probability with an AME of 0.035 (top right of Figure 3). In 
engineering the slope is flatter, but also positive for the entire range of consulting time-shares 
(AME = 0.022). In the publication intensive fields of life and natural science an increase in 
consulting increases exit probability at similar rates as in engineering (with AMEs of 0.021 and 
0.024), but with constant or declining impact and a lower exit probability in absolute terms. The 
higher exit propensity for social sciences is contrary to what we would expect based on prior 
evidence (e.g. Rentocchini et al. 2014) and is most likely due to the consideration of public sector 
consulting and its high prevalence in the social sciences in this study.   
In terms of control variables, we find that exit probability increases with age. We do not find 
women to have a higher propensity to cease publishing, even though prior literature has attributed 
exit to gender and family situation (Ginther and Kahn, 2004; Mairesse and Pezzoni, 2015). We 
further find that the better the ex-ante publication performance and international visibility, as 
measured by conference attendance, the less likely an academic is to stop publishing. The 
propensity of exit from academic research also decreases with other measures of research 
activity, such as peer group size within the institution and patenting (Table 4).  
------------------------ 
Table 4 about here 
------------------------ 
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------------------------ 
Figure 3 about here 
------------------------ 
4.3. Consulting and publication and citation outcomes 
The results from the endogenous switching models on research outcomes in the post-survey 
period are presented in Table 5 which shows the outcome equation for consulting-active and non-
consulting-active academics separately. Exiting academics, i.e. those that do not publish in the 
post-survey period, are excluded from these models as we are only interested in the productivity 
effects of those who remained research active. When we run these models inclusive of those that 
exit, estimated coefficients are naturally larger because they capture the “exit” effects from 
consulting as reflected in more zeros in the outcome variable.  
Our results suggest that consulting does not have a significant effect on publication numbers 
(model 1), which is contrary to prior studies by Mitchell and Rebne (1995) and Rentocchini et 
al. (2014) who found a positive or negative effect respectively. Consulting is however associated 
with fewer citations (model 3), an effect that stems from public sector consulting (model 4). The 
coefficient of public sector consulting is -0.014 and the squared term is positive, though very 
small, indicating a diminishing negative impact at higher consulting shares rather than a positive 
one. The AME of public consulting is still negative at -0.013 (s.e. = 0.004) which indicates that 
an increase in the public consulting share by 10 points leads to an average loss of 13% of field-
weighted citations per publication. The coefficient of private sector consulting is also negative, 
but much smaller in magnitude and insignificant. The AME is 0.010, but only significant at the 
10% level. These results suggest that public sector consulting could allow for fewer research 
spillovers as it primarily requires the preparation of reviews and commissioned reports that may 
result in publications of only little academic relevance (Salter, 1988; Jasanoff, 1990). While we 
find no negative effect for private sector consulting, we also do not confirm the positive effect 
for low levels reported in prior research (Mitchell and Rebne, 1995; Rentocchini et al. 2014). 
Again, the effect is likely not linear and the marginal effect may depend on the intensity of 
consulting. Figure 4 therefore depicts predicted values of field-weighted average citations as 
outcome variable over the consulting time-share range. The slope of the curve therefore illustrates 
the marginal effect of consulting at different levels of consulting (MERs). Here we see that an 
increase in public consulting from zero to 5% implies a decline in the predicted logged number 
of field-weighted citations from 0.88 to 0.81. In non-weighted and non-logged terms, the same 
increase in consulting results in a decline from 11.5 to 9.9 average citations per paper, i.e. to the 
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loss of 1.6 citations per paper which corresponds to about 19% of the sample median. At higher 
consulting shares the marginal effect of public consulting becomes smaller and eventually 
insignificant. For private sector consulting the effects are insignificant for the full range of 
consulting shares. 
------------------------ 
Table 5 about here 
------------------------ 
------------------------ 
Figure 4 about here 
------------------------ 
 
Looking at the MERs of moderators in Figure 5, we see that fewer field-weighted average 
citations are observed for most of the observed range of consulting time-shares for all academic 
ranks (detailed regression results available upon request). For assistant and full professors the 
effect reverses (i.e. turns positive) in the top percentiles of the consulting time-share distribution. 
Instead, the AME is -0.028 (s.e. = 0.017) for junior researchers and -0.038 (s.e. = 0.011) for 
assistant professors and thus substantially more negative than the overall effect and particularly 
compared to the -0.016 (s.e. = 0.008) for full professors. This confirms our expectation that those 
with fewer consulting opportunities will be less able to generate positive spillovers for their 
research. 
The lower part of Figure 5 differentiates the effects by type of consulting. Again we see that for 
all academic ranks the impact of public consulting is negative for most of the observed consulting 
time-share distribution. The impact is strongest for junior researchers [AME = -0.044 (s.e. = 
0.014)] and assistant professors [AME = -0.032 (s.e. = 0.011)] and more modest for full 
professors [AME -0.015 (s.e. = 0.006)] and senior researchers [-0.005 (s.e. = 0.010)]. In terms of 
non-field weighted citations this implies that for junior researchers an increase from zero to 10% 
consulting time-share leaves them with about 2.3 fewer citations per paper which corresponds to 
31% of the median value for junior researchers. 
Some assistant professors who engage heavily in consulting efforts with the public sector, 
however, benefit and receive relatively more citations than those at lower consulting time-shares, 
but still not more than those not active in consulting at all. Private sector consulting has no 
negative and even a positive effect on outcomes of assistant professors, but a negative effect for 
full professors [AME = -0.018 (s.e. = 0.010)] and, at lower consulting shares, also for junior 
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researchers [AME = -0.049 (s.e. = 0.023)]. These mixed effects may explain the overall only 
very weakly significant effect from private sector consulting.  
Differentiating by disciplinary field (top right of Figure 5), we see a continuous negative effect 
only for the life sciences, which is significantly negative up to a time-share of 50%. The marginal 
effects for natural sciences are negative up to 20% consulting time-share. In engineering, on the 
other hand, the marginal effects are initially negative and the curve has the steepest slope of all 
subject areas, but marginal effects become positive and significant for values above 30%, i.e. 
above the 90th percentile in this field. The AME [-0.031, (s.e. = 0.008)] is still negative and 
sizable for engineering. Our results only partially confirm Rentocchini et al. (2014) who find a 
negative effect of paid consulting science and engineering but not in medical sciences and social 
sciences. They also only find the strongest effect at high engagement levels, which is contrary to 
our findings which show the steepest slopes in the middle-ranges. 
We further see from the models presented in Table 5 that publication and citation performance 
is highly path-dependent. The pre-sample mean is positive, highly significant and the coefficients 
are similar in size for both consulting-active and non-consulting-active academics. We also find 
that publication output is larger for older academics and for professors. We do not observe 
differences between men and women regarding their publishing when we use field-weighted 
publication counts. Scientific attributes such as collaborative reach and international visibility 
are also all positively associated with publication output. We also find that publication numbers 
are lower for university academics, who have teaching obligations unlike most academics at 
PROs, whereas average citations do not differ. Patents are positively associated with field-
weighted publication numbers for consulting-active academics only. Note that the correlation 
coefficient 𝛼𝜌 is negative and significant only for the correlation between the consulting equation 
and the outcome equation for consulting active individuals. This suggests that individuals who 
engage in consulting publish fewer articles and receive fewer citations than a random individual 
from the sample would have published. Instead, those not engaged in consulting do no better or 
worse than the sample average. The likelihood-ratio test for joint independence of the three 
equations, however, is not significant in the publication count models where we exclude “exited” 
individuals suggesting that consulting and publication equations are not jointly determined. It 
should be noted, however, that the test is significant in models that include those that “exit”. In 
other words, much of the endogeneity in terms of two-way causation is taken out of the model 
by considering only those who remain research active. 
  ------------------------ 
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Figure 5 about here 
------------------------ 
5. Conclusions and implications 
Our study contributes to the literature on academic consulting and its impact on research and 
research dissemination. Investigating the effect of public and private sector consulting activities 
on exit from publishing and publication performance in a sample of academics at universities and 
public research organisations in Germany we find that, especially in the case of private sector 
consulting, a higher share of time devoted to consulting increases the probability of exit from 
academic work. At higher consulting time-shares this effect is strong for lower rank (pre-PhD) 
researchers, but also for faculty in permanent positions (full professors). Public sector consulting 
also affects exit probability, but only at relatively high consulting shares. The positive 
relationship between consulting and exit from publishing is more pronounced in the social 
sciences and engineering than in the natural sciences and life sciences. This is consistent with the 
observations that public-private wage gap is particularly high for engineers while opportunities 
for taking up new responsibilities outside academia, or external demand, may be particularly high 
for those from the social sciences and engineering.   
Results for academics who remain research-active show that consulting does not further reduce 
their ex-post research performance in terms of publication numbers. This result thus does not 
confirm concerns related to a potential detrimental effect of consulting on research disclosure as 
we do not find a decline in overall publication numbers. However, in the case of public 
consulting, we see lower average citations per paper in the ex-post period. Public sector 
consulting, likely requires participation in expert committees and boards of advisors which comes 
with the preparation of reviews and commissioned reports and thus entails work aspects that may 
create few financial and other positive spillovers for academic research.  Quantitatively we show 
that an increase in public consulting by ten percentage points implies a loss of up to 31% of 
citations per paper. While this price of consulting is not paid by researchers from all ranks, it 
should be noted that the decline is most pronounced for junior researchers. Considering, that 
typically junior researchers are still seeking to obtain permanent positions this puts them at a 
potential disadvantage on the academic labour market compared to their peers. It may also have 
a longer term impact on their research paths.  
The finding that private sector consulting, instead, does not impact research output, once we 
exclude non-publishing academics, suggests that it may be closer to the knowledge frontier and 
may therefore create more research spillovers which offset some of the negative trade-offs. Still, 
 22 
 
negative effects are observed for junior researchers, suggesting that they may lack the experience 
to realise such spillovers.  
Disciplinary field differences exist in the prevalence of consulting to different sectors, but less 
so in terms of the impact of consulting. While in the natural sciences consulting has little impact 
on citations, in the social and life sciences and in engineering higher engagement in consulting 
is associated with fewer citations per publication. In engineering the marginal effect turns, 
however, positive for consulting time-shares above the 90th percentile. This indicates that at the 
higher end consulting can create positive spillovers in more applied fields of science that apply 
academic knowledge to real-world problems. Thus, for highly engaged academics in engineering 
there seems to be a prize for consulting.    
Our findings have important implications for research institutions and policy. First, for academics 
in earlier stages of their academic career and also for senior academic staff, consulting activities 
may pave the way for alternative career paths or activities outside academic research, as indicated 
by an exit from academic publishing. Training and institutional consulting support for junior 
academic staff could thus have the potential to open up career options outside academic research. 
Professors and research group leaders may engage junior researchers in consulting work to 
broaden their profile and to point to career opportunities outside academe. The provision of 
alternative options is important as not all those trained in academia are able to remain there (e.g. 
Stephan, 2012; Hottenrott and Lawson, 2017). However, encouraging external consulting could 
also lead to a brain drain at both junior and senior levels if academics cease to focus on scientific 
research relevant for the scientific community. This may also have detrimental career effects for 
those young researchers seeking an academic career path. 
Second, our selection equations show that academics that engage in consulting are on average 
involved in more grant acquisition and are highly connected. They may therefore serve as 
important knowledge brokers with external organisations, leveraging additional income for their 
institution while providing advice. While this may come at the cost of lower quality research 
output or the exit from academic publishing, it may contribute to a division of labour within the 
academic institution that allows for different work patterns amongst academics. Universities may 
therefore selectively encourage specific academics to act as such knowledge brokers. 
Third, policies (e.g. promotion requirements) to engage all academics to interact with external 
organisations may have negative consequences for academic research. In particular, explicit or 
implicit obligations to take on consulting roles should not exist. We find that academics that do 
not engage in consulting are often less focussed on external interactions in general and pursue 
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research that attracts more citations. Such individuals may as a result of engagement policies 
have their time diverted from their research efforts to the detriment of their research. Eventually, 
the results suggest that a one-size-fits-all rule for managing consulting activities of researchers 
at universities or PROs will not work best, but that universities may be advised to arrange 
disciplinary and rank specific rules. Specifically, the consulting activities of junior researchers 
need to be carefully managed.   
Overall, the benefits from academic consulting likely outweigh the costs in terms of research 
output. For example, Cohen et al. (2002) report that 32% of surveyed US firms consider 
consulting an important mechanism to gain insights into academic research. This figure is higher 
than for other forms of knowledge transfer such as contract research, patents or personnel 
exchanges. In the case of public consulting, Haucap and Thomas (2014) find in a survey of more 
than 300 civil servants and politicians in Germany that more than 70% of users of academic 
knowledge consider expert reports and personal communication with academics as helpful or 
very helpful for their work, making consulting more important than academic publications. Thus, 
while we do find some negative effects on research quality as measured through citations, we 
cannot conclude that the price of consulting is high compared to the likely benefits for private 
sector firms and public sector agents.   
Despite all efforts, the study is not without some limitations. First, we do not observe consulting 
activity over time. Individuals may undergo different phases in their career in which they are 
more or less consulting active. The balance between these periods could be pivotal to understand 
the full effects of consulting engagement. Second, some individual level unobserved 
heterogeneity might remain despite our attempts to capture these econometrically. Thus, 
longitudinal treatment effects analysis might be used in future research to test for the observed 
cross-sectional patterns. Finally, some limitations arise in terms of generalizability of our results 
to the overall population of researchers in Germany and to the population of academics in general. 
Individual wage levels, specific salary schemes or contracts may determine the attractiveness of 
consulting. Further the division of public research into universities, universities of applied 
sciences and public research organisation without teaching mission in Germany and the mobility 
of researchers between these institutions may have implications for the results. We therefore 
encourage further research on academic consulting especially regarding its role for inter-sector 
mobility of academics and for the evolution of career paths. Moreover, while we considered time 
shares rather than monetary rewards for consulting, it would be desirable to better understand the 
link between remuneration and the effects of consulting on other academic activities. While well 
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paid consulting that is informed by research may increase the academics’ institutional research 
budget through follow-up research contracts and therefore facilitate growth and productivity of 
the research group, consulting activities that result in private income may be more prone to lead 
to a brain drain from academic work. It seems therefore crucial to further study the contractual 
mechanisms in future work.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Box plots of outcome variables over consulting time-shares (951 observations) 
 
Note: Percentiles defined as ranges based on the consulting time-share percentiles for consulting-active researchers 
1 to 10 = 1, 11 to 50 = 2, 51 to 90 = 3 and > 90 = 4. Graph colour scheme from Bischof (2016). 
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Figure 2: Predictive margins (95% confidence intervals) for “exit” (909 obs.: age<65) 
  
Note: Predicted exit probability depicted in the y-axis and consulting share on the x-axis. Predictive margins are calculated at the 
deciles of the consulting time-share distribution. The slope of the predictive margins curve represents the marginal change in the 
predicted probability for a change in the consulting time-share, i.e. the marginal effect. The mean values and the 95th percentiles 
refer to the subsample of consulting-active researchers.  
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Figure 3: Predictive margins for “exit” by rank and field 
 
  
Note: Predictive margins are only shown for the range of consulting values where the margins are significant at least 10% 
confidence level. Predicted exit probability depicted in the y-axis and consulting share on the x-axis. Predictive margins are 
calculated at the deciles of the consulting time-share distribution. The slope of the predictive margins curve represents the 
marginal change in the predicted probability for a change in the consulting time-share, i.e. the marginal effect. Dashed lines 
indicate values beyond the 95th percentile of the consulting share distribution.  
 
Figure 4: Predictive margins with 95% confidence intervals for field-weighted av. citations 
per publication (without “exits”, 784 obs.) 
Note: Predicted outcome variable depicted in the y-axis and consulting share on the x-axis. Predictive margins are calculated at 
the deciles of the consulting time-share distribution. The slope of the predictive margins curve represents the marginal change in 
the predicted value of the outcome variable for a change in the consulting time-share, i.e. the marginal effect.  
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Figure 5: Predictive margins for field weighted av. citations per publication by rank and 
field (without “exits”, 784 obs.) 
 
 
Note: Predictive margins are only shown for the range of consulting values where the margins are significant at least 10% 
confidence level and only within the relevant observed conulting intensity range for the respective group. Predicted outcome 
variable depicted in the y-axis and consulting share on the x-axis. Predictive margins are calculated at the deciles of the consulting 
time-share distribution. The slope of the predictive margins curve represents the marginal change in the predicted value of the 
outcome variable for a change in the consulting time-share, i.e. the marginal effect. Dashed lines indicate values beyond the 95th 
percentile of the consulting share distribution.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable unit source median mean s.d. min. max. 
Outcome Variables        
exit2009-2013 count ISI WoS 0 0.18 0.38 0 1 
publications2009-2013 count ISI WoS 6 12.44 20.13 0 278 
av. citations2009-2013 fraction ISI WoS 8.44 11.85 15.82 0 157.67 
field-weighted publications2009-2013 fraction ISI WoS 0.53 1 1.57 0 16.93 
field-weighted av. citations2009-2013 fraction ISI WoS 0.68 1 1.57 0 23.14 
Consulting activities        
consulting [yes / no] binary Survey 0 0.44 0.50 0 1 
public consulting [yes / no] binary Survey 0 0.31 0.46 0 1 
private consulting [yes / no] binary Survey 0 0.27 0.44 0 1 
consulting  percentage Survey 0 5.31 10.27 0 100 
public consulting  percentage Survey 0 3.06 7.96 0 100 
private consulting  percentage Survey 0 2.25 6.23 0 100 
Moderators        
junior researcher binary Survey 0 0.09 0.29 0 1 
senior researcher binary Survey 0 0.26 0.44 0 1 
assistant professor binary Survey 0 0.11 0.32 0 1 
full professor binary Survey 1 0.54 0.50 0 1 
social sciences binary Survey 0 0.21 0.41 0 1 
life sciences binary Survey 0 0.30 0.46 0 1 
natural sciences binary Survey 0 0.31 0.46 0 1 
engineering binary Survey 0 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Controls        
age count Survey 49 49.40 8.28 28 74 
female binary Survey 0 0.15 0.36 0 1 
publications2002-2008 count ISI WoS 4 11.70 21.03 0 305 
average citations2002-2008 fraction ISI WoS 16.13 24.18 31.67 0 344.2 
field-weighted publications2002-2008 fraction ISI WoS 0.47 1 1.81 0 24.52 
field-weighted average citations2002-2008 fraction ISI WoS 0.69 1 1.39 0 17.18 
average number of co-authors2002-2008 fraction ISI WoS 4.46 5.99 17.30 0 332.83 
collaborative reach2002-2008 ordinal Survey 3 3.06 1.36 0 5 
international visibility fraction Survey 0.71 0.69 0.17 0 1 
industry funding2002-2006 amount  Survey 0 0.16 0.46 0 11 
public funding2002-2006 amount  Survey 0.40 1.10 3.03 0 75 
peergroup size count Survey 10 39.46 148.47 0 3,000 
university binary Survey 1 0.59 0.49 0 1 
patentspre2009 count EPO/DPMA 0 1.06 3.72 0 41 
coauthorship industry binary Survey 0 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Exclusion restrictions        
regio skills percentage INKAR 9 10.01 6.03 0.70 43.80 
firm binary Survey 0 0.17 0.38 0 1 
techtransfer industry binary Survey 0 0.43 0.50 0 1 
Note: Number of observations = 951. Funding variables in 100.000€. There are two individuals with consulting shares of 100%, one for 
each type of consulting. Both are project leaders so that the answer seem indeed realistic and no measurement error. The reference period 
for the citation variables (for instance 2009-2013 or 2002-2008) refers to publication in that period and the citations received by these 
publications until autumn 2015. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics by type of consulting (selected variables) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
Note: 133 researchers (14%) engage in both public and private sector consulting. Two-sided t-tests presented [Pr(|T| > |t|)].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No consulting Consulting 
active 
 
Private sector 
consulting 
 
Public sector 
consulting 
 
I. 
vs I. vs. 
I. 
vs 
I II. III. IV. II. III. IV. 
Observations 537 414 255 292   
  
 
mean (s.d.) mean (s.d.) mean (s.d.) mean (s.d.) t-test 
Outcome variables      
exit2009-2013 0.17 (0.37) 0.19 (0.39) 0.13 (0.34) 0.19 (0.39) 0.46 0.91 0.38 
(0.39) publications2009-2013 11.33 (17.63) 13.88 (22.90) 15.55 (24.24) 13.58 (22.25) 0.05 0.01 0.11 
(22.25
) 
av. citations2009-2013 12.72  (16.99) 10.71 (14.11) 11.41 (14.85) 9.93 (11.84) 0.05 0.29 0.01 
(11.84
) 
field-weighted publications2009-2013 0.88 (1.44) 1.15 (1.73) 1.26 (1.73) 1.14 (1.74) 0.01 0.00 0.03 
(1.74) field-weighted av. citations2009-2013 1.01 (1.51) 0.99 (1.65) 1.02 (1.68) 0.92 (1.36) 0.90 0.92 0.42 
(1.36) Moderators        
junior researcher 0.10 (0.31) 0.08 (0.27) 0.06 (0.24) 0.09 (0.29) 0.24 0.06 0.48 
senior researcher 0.26 (0.44) 0.25 (0.43) 0.27 (0.44) 0.21 (0.02) 0.67 0.86 0.12 
assistant professor 0.15 (0.36) 0.06 (0.24) 0.05 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) 0.00  0.00 0.00 
full professor 0.48 (0.50) 0.61 (0.49) 0.62 (0.49) 0.64 (0.48) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
social sciences 0.19 (0.40) 0.23 (0.42) 0.14 (0.35) 0.26 (0.44) 0.18 0.07 0.02 
life sciences 0.28 (0.45) 0.32 (0.47) 0.31 (0.46) 0.33 (0.47) 0.29 0.54 0.16 
natural sciences 0.38 (0.49) 0.21 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41) 0.22 (0.41) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
engineering 0.14 (0.35) 0.24 (0.43) 0.34 (0.48) 0.18 (0.39) 0.00 0.00 0.09 
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Table 3: Results of probit and simultaneous probit models on private and public sector 
consulting 
Model 1   2 
Dependent variable 
consulting  
[yes / no] 
 public consulting 
[yes / no] 
private consulting 
[yes / no] 
  df/dx    s.e. df/dx  s.e.   df/dx  s.e.   
Moderators                   
junior researcher Reference Category 
senior researcher -0.022 *** 0.006 -0.064 *** 0.009 0.018 *** 0.003 
assistant professor -0.129 *** 0.022 -0.143 *** 0.020 -0.063 *** 0.020 
full professor 0.062  * 0.036 -0.017   0.047 0.066 ***  0.021 
social sciences Reference Category 
life sciences -0.097 * 0.057 -0.100 * 0.057 0.023 * 0.013 
natural sciences -0.246 *** 0.025 -0.217 *** 0.051 -0.056  0.036 
engineering -0.122 *** 0.039 -0.138 *** 0.034 0.047  0.046 
Controls          
age 0.003 *** 0.001 0.005 *** 0.001 0.002 ** 0.001 
female -0.005   0.022 0.035   0.029 -0.052 ** 0.021 
field-weighted publications2002-2008 0.006 **  0.003 0.006   0.004 0.009 *** 0.003 
field-weighted av. citations2002-2008 -0.026 *** 0.006 -0.026 *** 0.005 -0.009   0.009 
collaborative reach2002-2008 0.016 *  0.009 0.034 *** 0.012 -0.002   0.008 
international visibility 0.035   0.046 -0.003   0.040 0.081  0.054 
ln(industry funding)2002-2006 0.225 ** 0.112 -0.085  0.053 0.225 *** 0.088 
ln(public funding)2002-2006 0.083 *  0.043 0.200 *** 0.015 -0.059 *** 0.019 
ln(peergroup size) -0.021 *** 0.008 -0.019 *** 0.007 -0.008  0.010 
university -0.116 ** 0.053 -0.078 **  0.037 -0.042 *  0.023 
ln(patentspre2009) -0.012   0.026 -0.061 *** 0.011 0.012   0.012 
coauthorship industry  0.077 * 0.042 0.057   0.048 0.061 * 0.034 
Exclusion restrictions                   
regio skills -0.006 ** 0.003 -0.008 ** 0.003 -0.005 *  0.002 
firm 0.042 ** 0.018 0.050   0.031 0.052   0.034 
techtransfer industry  0.212 *** 0.020 0.073 *** 0.016 0.255 *** 0.011 
Log pseudolikelihood -560.226 -921.189 
𝜌[equ. 1/2]  - 0.522 (0.046)*** 
Note: Number of observations = 951. Average marginal effects presented. *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 
10%). All models contain a constant. If we include unweighted publication and citation variables the signs and significance 
levels are similar.  
 38 
 
Table 4: Estimation results from probit models with selection on “exit” 
  Model 1 (full sample) Model 2 (full sample) Model 3 (age < 65) Model 4 (age < 65) 
  coef.  s.e. coef.  s.e. coef.  s.e. coef.  s.e. 
Consulting activities                       
consulting  0.025 ** 0.010       0.030 *** 0.011       
consulting² <-0.001   <0.001       <-0.001   <0.001       
public consulting       -0.003      0.014       0.007    0.018 
public consulting²       0.001 * <0.001       <0.001     <0.001 
private consulting       0.024    *** 0.006       0.026    *** 0.004 
private consulting²       <-0.001 ** <0.001       <-0.001     ** <0.001 
Controls                      
age 0.023 *** 0.005 0.026    *** 0.008 0.028 *** 0.010 0.031    ** 0.012 
female -0.017   0.190 -0.031      0.210 0.007   0.187 -0.008     0.205 
junior researcher Reference Category 
senior researcher -0.304 *** 0.049 -0.224    *** 0.038 -0.372    *** 0.062 -0.287    *** 0.047 
assistant professor -0.514 *** 0.128 -0.452    *** 0.108 -0.586    *** 0.138 -0.508     *** 0.132 
full professor -0.230 ** 0.103 -0.252    * 0.148 -0.256    * 0.142 -0.259    0.186 
field-weighted publications2002-2008 -0.648 *** 0.038 -0.670    *** 0.060 -0.631   *** 0.036 -0.655    *** 0.059 
field-weighted av. citations2002-2008 -0.101  0.119 -0.117    0.125 -0.108    0.122 -0.121    0.133 
ln(industry funding)2002-2006 1.143    0.737 1.233 * 0.748 1.458     ** 0.663 1.620 ** 0.650 
ln(public funding)2002-2006 0.013    0.151 -0.035  0.164 0.074     0.115 0.012  0.118 
collaborative reach2002-2008 <-0.001    0.059 0.024     0.054 0.009    0.063 0.031    0.055 
international visibility -1.509 *** 0.270 -1.710 *** 0.263 -1.281 *** 0.189 -1.452 *** 0.273 
ln(peergroup size) -0.070    ** 0.031 -0.090    *** 0.013 -0.089     * 0.046 -0.108 *** 0.030 
university 0.130    0.142 0.173    0.182 0.037    0.209 0.067    0.243 
social sciences Reference Category 
life sciences -0.974    *** 0.083 -1.021 *** 0.083 -1.078 *** 0.111 -1.121 *** 0.102 
natural sciences -1.106 *** 0.135 -1.171 *** 0.084 -1.090 *** 0.095 -1.145 *** 0.063 
engineering -0.570 ** 0.291 -0.601 ** 0.241 -0.599 ** 0.288 -0.618 ** 0.273 
ln(patentspre2009) -.108    ** 0.047 -0.127    *** 0.036 -0.181  0.160 -0.202    0.152 
coauthorship industry  -0.205    0.224 -0.281    0.264 -0.199  0.225 -0.260  0.242 
# observations 951 951 909 909 
# consulting-active obs. (2nd stage)  414 
414 
  
414  
  
392 392 
Log pseudolikelihood -686.24 -683.62 -653.92 -651.66 
Wald test of indep. equations  chi2(1) 3.09* 2.97* 4.62** 3.03*  
𝛼𝜌 0.966 (0.549)* 0.731 (0.424)* 1.128 (0.524)** 0.896 (0.515)* 
Note: Number of observations is= 951. Marginal effects at means. *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). All models contain a constant. 
Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. If we include unweighted publication and citation variables the signs and significance levels are similar.  
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Table 5: Estimation results from endogenous switching models on research outcomes (without “exits”) 
  
ln(field-weighted 
publications2009-2013) 
ln(field-weighted 
publications2009-2013) 
ln(field-weighted av. 
citations2009-2013) 
ln(field-weighted av.  
citations2009-2013) 
  no consulting consulting no 
consulting 
consulting no consulting consulting no consulting consulting 
consulting     <-0.001              -0.011 ***         
      (0.004)               (0.004)          
consulting²     <-0.001               <0.001          
      (<0.001)               (<0.001)          
public consulting              -0.006          -0.014 *** 
              (0.005)          (0.005)  
public consulting²             <0.001          <0.001 * 
              (<0.001)          (<0.001)  
private consulting             -0.002          -0.011 * 
              (0.005)          (0.006)  
private consulting²             <-0.001          <0.001  
              (<0.001)          (<0.001)  
age 0.043 ** 0.076 *** 0.043 ** 0.077 *** -0.006  0.030  -0.006  0.031  
  (0.019)  (0.027)  (0.019)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.022)  (0.028)  (0.022)  
age2 -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** <0.001  <-0.001  <0.001  <-0.001  
  (<0.001)  (<0.001)  (<0.000)  (<0.000)  (<0.001)  (<0.001)  (<0.001)  (<0.001)  
ln(average number of co-authors) 0.055  0.029  0.055  0.026  0.078 ** -0.071  0.078 ** -0.071  
 (0.047)  (0.050)  (0.047)  (0.050)  (0.031)  (0.057)  (0.031)  (0.057)  
ln(field-weighted pubs)2002-2008 /      
               ln(field-weighted 
av.citations)2002-2008 
     
0.568 *** 0.680 *** 0.568 *** 0.683 *** 0.506 *** 0.490 *** 0.506 *** 0.485 *** 
(0.042)  (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.043)  (0.071)  (0.062)  (0.071)  (0.062)  
no_publication_d / no_avcit_d 0.190 ** 0.216 ** 0.190 ** 0.219 ** 0.277 *** 0.029  0.277 *** 0.029  
  (0.093)  (0.095)  (0.093)  (0.095)  (0.083)  (0.124)  (0.083)  (0.124)  
ln(industry funding)2002-2006 -0.120  -0.018  -0.120  -0.002  -0.134  0.309 * -0.134  0.311 ** 
  (0.166)  (0.111)  (0.166)  (0.120)  (0.175)  (0.159)  (0.176)  (0.156)  
ln(public funding)2002-2006 0.069  <0.001  0.069  0.001  0.092  -0.061  0.092  -0.060  
  (0.057)  (0.074)  (0.057)  (0.076)  (0.067)  (0.077)  (0.067)  (0.075)  
collaborative reach2002-2008 0.028 ** 0.019  0.028 ** 0.022  0.016  0.003  0.016  0.004  
  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.017)  
ln(patentspre2009) 0.007   0.070 ** 0.007  0.067 ** -0.027  -0.033  -0.027  -0.034  
  (0.027)   (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.029)  (0.024)  (0.029)  (0.024)  (0.029)  
Log pseudolikelihood -643.51 -642.52 -776.96 -776.52 
Wald test of indep. equations chi2(2) 4.16 3.94 7.95** 7.74** 
𝛼𝜌 (consulting = 0) -0.074 (0.175) -0.071 (0.173) 0.111 (0.234) 0.110 (0.236) 
𝛼𝜌 (consulting = 1) -0.398 (0.186)** -0.387 (0.187)** -0.358 (0.126)*** -0.356 (0.127)*** 
Note: N = 784. *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). All models contain a gender dummy, a dummy variable for coauthorship with industry, ln(peergroup size), 
international visibility and rank dummies as well as a variable indicating university affiliation and a constant. Coefficients presented; robust standard errors in parenthesis below. For 
unweighted publication and citation variables the signs and significance levels are similar. Outcome variables and logged controls are calculated as the natural logarithm of the variable 
plus one. First stage estimation results and results for the full sample available upon request.  
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Notes:  
i Especially sponsorship from the private sector may include income from consulting projects with firms and 
therefore indirectly reflect an academic’s engagement in consulting activities with the private sector. In addition, 
consulting and contract research for industry are highly correlated (Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005). 
ii PROs play an important role in the German academic research landscape. PROs include the Fraunhofer and Max-
Planck Society, as well as the Helmholtz- and Leibniz Associations, and accounted for around 20% of academic 
staff in 2012 and for 34.4% of the European Research Council grants awarded to German institutions during the 
period 2007-2013 (DFG, 2015).  
iii While German law in principle requires research staff at universities and PROs to report additional consulting 
income to their employer, there are certain exemption levels that vary between different institutions below which no 
reporting is required (Hochschul-Nebentätigkeitsverordnung, HNtV). Thus, income information provided by 
institutions would not provide a full picture. 
iv The questionnaire asked: “Please give the percentage of working time you currently spend on the following 
activities.” Respondents distributed timeshares over: research, research funded by research grants, teaching, 
administration, private sector consulting and public sector consulting. Unlike research funded by research grants the 
general research category refers to research financed by institutional core funding which is in Germany typically 
distributed to the universities or PROs through the state and is not subject to a specific project proposal, application 
or selection process. See Table A.4 in the Online Appendix for an overview of the division of time. 
v By comparison, a 2015 survey of academic staff in the UK found that academics spend about 40% on research, 
30% on teaching and 21% on administrative tasks (Hughes et al., 2016). The higher teaching share will be primarily 
due to the additional surveying of PROs in our case rather than country differences.  
vi The variable takes values from zero to five, where zero stands for ‘no collaborative work’, one for ‘collaboration 
only within the home institution’, two for ‘collaboration only inside Germany’, three for ‘European-wide 
collaboration, but not beyond’. Categories four and five capture collaboration with North America and the rest of 
the world, respectively. 
vii  The pre-sample variables are adjusted to the respective dependent variable, i.e. based on field-weighted 
publication counts if the dependent variable is ln(field-weighted publications+1) and field-weighted average 
citations in the model for ln(field-weighted av. citations+1).  
viii We checked the sensitivity of the results of the publication outcome models to different estimation methods (OLS, 
Tobit, Poisson and negative binomial estimation) and to different specifications of the dependent variable (levels 
versus log transformation). These tests showed that estimated coefficients are quantitatively and qualitatively similar 
(see Table A.6 in the Online Appendix).  
ix See Table A.5 in the Online Appendix for corresponding estimations using population weights. More precisely, 
we employ field-institution type inverse probability weights that should capture some of the observed differences 
also in terms of gender and age, and apply inverse probability weighting to test the robustness of our results to these 
sample properties, especially bias caused by field or institute sampling through population weights. The differences 
in estimated coefficients are minor and not qualitatively in nature. 
x We also estimate simultaneous equation models on the timeshares devoted to public and private sector consulting. 
The effects of the explanatory variables are very similar to the ones in the probit and the correlation coefficient 
between the timeshare equations is insignificant (see Table A4.b in the Online Appendix). 
                                                 
 
